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CAN THE LIQUIDITY RULE KEEP MUTUAL FUNDS
AFLOAT?
CONTEXTUALIZING THE COLLAPSE OF THIRD
AVENUE MANAGEMENT FOCUSED CREDIT FUND
Nicolas Valderrama+
In 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Rule 22e4 (the “Liquidity Rule”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as
amended (“1940 Act”), and related reporting and disclosure requirements. One
industry analyst described the Liquidity Rule’s objective as making sure that
mutual funds implement “effective liquidity risk management programs,”
especially in light of mutual funds’ prevalence in the economy and in American
households.1 Yet, as one Reuters analyst suggested, the SEC also seemed to
have adopted these liquidity regulations to avoid a “repeat of the kind of
problems that surfaced with the collapse of the [mutual fund] Third Avenue
Focused Credit . . . in December 2015.”2
This Comment takes a closer look at some of the “problems” that Third
Avenue Management Focused Credit Fund (“the Fund” or “Focused Credit”)
faced and the complex liquidity implications of some of its investments. This
Comment then lays out the roots of the SEC's concern over mutual funds'
liquidity and the regulatory standards in this area prior to the adoption of the
Liquidity Rule. Thereafter, this Comment distills the elements of the Liquidity
Rule, and observes how it could apply, in theory, to help prevent other mutual
funds from suffering the same fate as Focused Credit. Lastly, this Comment
provides thoughts on more recent market events (i.e., related to the COVID-19
crisis) and how they may present a good opportunity to test the effectiveness of
the Liquidity Rule.

+
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2021, Certificate Candidate
- Securities Law Program; B.A. Economics, The George Washington University, 2017. The author
would like to thank Professor Jeffrey Puretz for his invaluable feedback and guidance through this
writing process, the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their help in
preparing this Comment for publication, and his parents, Carlos Valderrama and Viviana Cristo, as
well as his brother Thomas, for their unwavering support. All errors are the author’s only.
1. Todd Ehret, SEC Tackles Fund Liquidity Complexity with Rule Proposal, Delay, New
Guidance, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-liquidity-rule/sectackles-fund-liquidity-complexity-with-rule-proposal-delay-new-guidance-idUSKBN1H32N5;
see Jennifer Rudden, Share of Households Owning Mutual Funds in the U.S. 1980-2019, STATISTA
(May 7, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/246224/mutual-funds-owned-by-americanhouseholds/ (illustrating that between 1995 and 2018, the share of households owning mutual funds
in the United States went from 28.7% to 44.8%).
2. Ehret, supra note 1.
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I. BRIEF BACKGROUND
An increasing number of Americans rely every year on open-end mutual funds
to achieve their long-term financial goals, whether that is “preparing for
retirement, saving for education, purchasing a house, or preparing for
emergencies.”3 In 2018, mutual funds held $17.7 trillion in total net assets, with
roughly one out of every three Americans – 99.5 million individuals and 56
million households – putting their dollars to work through these investment
vehicles.4
At their core, mutual funds are companies that pool money from many
investors, invest that money in securities (such as stocks, bonds, other types of
debt, or a combination of different assets), and give to investors shares that
represent their “part ownership in the fund and the income” and the gains it
generates.5 A key characteristic of a mutual fund is redeemability, that is,
investors’ ability to sell their shares back to the fund (i.e., “redeem” their shares)
on any business day” to get their money out, with the assurance that the fund
will stand ready to meet such redemption requests promptly.6 A fund’s ability
“to meet redemptions without significantly diluting the interests of remaining
shareholders” is referred to as the fund’s liquidity.7
During 2015, the SEC was particularly concerned with mutual funds’
liquidity, and, on October 15 of that year rolled out a key rule proposal
addressing funds’ management of liquidity risk.8 Concurrently, the SEC
proposed rule and form amendments aimed at modernizing mutual funds’
reporting and disclosure regimes.9 Former SEC Commissioner Kara Stein noted
that “[n]othing is more fundamental . . . to open-end mutual funds than
redeemability,” suggesting that the SEC had proposed Rule 22e-4 to protect
investors’ presumed expectation that they would be able get their money out
promptly, if desired.10 Coincidentally, the Rule 22e-4 Proposing Release, came
3. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2019 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, 54 (59th
ed. 2019), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2019_factbook.pdf [hereinafter ICI 2019 FACT BOOK].
4. Id. at 54, 56.
5. Mutual
Funds,
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/basics/investment-products/mutual-funds-andexchange-traded-funds-etfs (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
6. Investment Company Institute, Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund
Liquidity, ICI FAQS & RESOURCE CENTERS (Feb. 2018), https://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/
mfs/faqs_mf_liquidity. This article focuses on open-ended mutual funds but briefly discusses
exchange traded funds (“ETFs”), which offer the possibility for investors to redeem their shares by
selling them on the secondary market. Id.
7. Id.
8. Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Swing Pricing; Re-Opening of
Comment Period for Investment Company Reporting Modernization Release; Proposed Rule,
Release No. IC-31835, 80 Fed. Reg. 62274 (Oct. 15, 2015) (hereinafter “Proposing Release”).
9. Id. at 62,303–305.
10. SEC Commissioner Kara M. Stein, Statement on Open-End Fund Liquidity Risk
Management Programs and Swing Pricing, SEC (Sept. 22, 2015) https://www.sec.gov/news/
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just a few months before what industry analysists referred to as “the biggest
mutual fund blowup since the 2008 financial crisis,” the collapse of Third
Avenue Management Focused Credit Fund.11 Then, in 2016, the SEC adopted
Rule 22e-4 as well as the reporting and disclosure requirements.12
At Focused Credit’s peak, in the first half of 2014, it held over $3.2 billion
dollars in assets and outpaced its competition with above average returns.13
Focused Credit’s investment strategy centered around investing in “credit
instruments . . . rated below investment grade,” and “under normal
circumstances,” it placed “at least [eighty percent] of the Fund’s net assets . . .
in bonds and other types of credit instruments.”14 Specifically, the Fund focused
on a “relatively small number of issuers,” investing heavily in below investmentgrade corporate debt such as high-yield (“junk”) bonds and secured loans.15 As
an analyst at Reuters noted, the Fund even disclosed that as of July 2015, it held
roughly twenty percent of its assets in securities that are “hard to value and
trade.”16 Commenters later attributed the Fund’s downfall to its inability to meet
investors’ redemptions because of the “risk[y]” and “illiquid” assets in its
portfolio.17
As one analyst suggested, during positive conditions for the bond market, the
price of some of the Fund’s high-yield securities was bid up in anticipation that
they would produce high returns,18 implying that if the Fund had tried to sell
statement/stein-open-meeting-liquidity-risk-management.html; see Proposing Release, supra note
8, at 62,276.
11. Ross Kerber & Tim McLaughlin, Massachusetts Probes if Third Avenue Investors Had
Early Word on Liquidation, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fundsthird-avenue-massachusetts-idUSKBN0TX2BS20151214; Tim McLaughlin, et al., Hidden in
Plain Sight: Big Risks at Failed Third Avenue Fund Were Clear to Some, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2015,
5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-thirdavenue-junk-insight/hidden-in-plainsight-big-risks-at-failed-third-avenue-fund-were-clear-to-some-idUSKBN0U627V20151223.
12. Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, Release No. IC-32315, 81
Fed. Reg. 82,142 (Oct. 13, 2016) (hereinafter “Adopting Release”) (noting that Rule 22e-4 applies
to “open-end management investment companies, including open-end exchange-traded funds” but
does not apply to money market funds).
13. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMMENTARY AND SEMI-ANNUAL
REPORT 28, 44 (2014), https://thirdave.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TAF-2014-SemiAnnual-Report.pdf. Focused Credit was one of five “non-diversified . . . investment series” (i.e.
funds) that were part of Third Avenue Trust (the “Trust”), an open-end, management investment
company; and Third Avenue Management LLC served as investment advisor for the five funds
within the Trust. Id. at 49.
14. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, Summary Prospectus: Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund,
SUMMARY PROSPECTUS 2 (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1031661/
000093041315001348/c80771_497k.htm.
15. Id.
16. McLaughlin, supra note 11.
17. Id.
18. Dave Dierking, 3 Takeaways From the Collapse of the Third Avenue Focused Credit
Fund, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 28, 2016, 3:36 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/3961454-3takeaways-collapse-third-avenue-focused-credit-fund (noting that “when the economic
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such securities then, a ready market would have likely been available.19
However, during the second half of 2014, Focused Credit produced negative
returns, which the Fund’s portfolio manager attributed to the weakening of the
bond market and the increased volatility in the overall market caused by a wide
range of macroeconomic risks.20 The Fund’s shareholders eventually started
withdrawing their money, presumably uneasy due to the market’s volatility and
the Fund’s negative returns, and by April 2015, investors’ redemptions had
caused a net outflow of more than $186 million dollars.21 Focused Credit took
some measures to ensure that it could meet redemptions, like “holding a net [ten
percent] allocation to cash” and “ha[ving] a line of credit in place,” but these
proved largely insufficient.22
Despite the Fund’s attempts to convince investors that its long-term outlook
remained positive,23 redemptions continued to accelerate, accounting for a net
outflow of more than $938 million dollars for the year ended October 31, 2015.24
According to an industry analyst, Focused Credit was unable to sell its risky and
low-rated assets without doing so at far below market value prices, with demand
for such debt drying up, which in turn prevented the Fund from raising the cash
to meet redemptions.25
As an industry analyst reported, by early December 2015, Focused Credit
announced the decision to cease its operations, halt all investor redemptions, and
environment was advantageous, securities prices were bid up in anticipation that a recovery was in
play”); Jeffrey Ptak & Sarah Bush, Third Avenue Focused Credit Abruptly Shuttered,
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/733021/third-avenuefocused-credit-abruptly-shuttered.
19. See Bid up, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
bid%20up (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (“to raise the price of (something, such as property at auction)
by a succession of offers”).
20. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMMENTARY AND FIRST QUARTER
REPORT 29–30 (2015), https://thirdave.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/TAF-ShareholderLetters-and-Reports-Q1-2015.pdf.
21. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 56 (2015), https://thirdave.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/TAF-Shareholder-Letters-and-Reports-Q2-2015.pdf. Net outflow “[f]or
the Six Months Ended April 30, 2015” is calculated taking into account the reported “Net
increase/(decrease)” in the dollar “amount” for both “Investor Class” shares (-$124,230,765) and
“Institutional Class” shares (-$62,130,296), which resulted from adding the value of “[s]hares sold,
[s]hares issued upon reinvestment of dividends and distributions”, and “[s]hares redeemed.” Id.
22. Ptak, supra note 18.
23. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMMENTARY AND THIRD QUARTER
REPORT 29–36 (2015), https://thirdave.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/TAF-ShareholderLetters-and-Report-Q3-2015.pdf.
24. THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMMENTARY AND FOURTH QUARTER
REPORT 75 (2015), https://thirdave.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/TAF-Shareholder-Lettersand-Report-Q4-2015.pdf. Net outflow “[f]or the Year Ended October 31, 2015” is calculated
taking into account the reported “Net increase/(decrease)” in the dollar “amount” for both “Investor
Class” and “Institutional Class” shares, which resulted from adding the value of “[s]hares sold”,
“[s]hares issued upon reinvestment of dividends and distributions”, and “[s]hares redeemed.” Id.
25. Dierking, supra note 19; Ptak, supra note 19.

2021]

Can the Liquidity Rule Keep Mutual Funds Afloat?

321

in an “unusual legal strategy” liquidate the $778.5 million fund by “transferring
all of its investments to a liquidating trust, and then using the trust to return
money to shareholders over time.”26 This, another analyst noted, was “the first
time a mutual fund . . . curbed redemptions without first obtaining authorization
from the [SEC].”27 Presumably, the SEC staff objected to the Fund transferring
its assets to a liquidating trust and thereby escaping the redemption provisions
of the 1940 Act, without SEC approval.28
On December 16, 2014, with its assets still in free fall (i.e. with net outflows
of over $1.1 billion dollars) and facing an ever-growing number of investor
requests for withdrawal, the Fund sought an exemption from the redemption
requirements of the 1940 Act, and further asked for the exemptive order to be
effective immediately and issued without a notice period.29 Since SEC rules
normally require that notice of exemptive applications be published in the
Federal Register and that interested persons be given an opportunity to request
a hearing, this was a highly unusual request for a mutual fund.30 Nevertheless,
the SEC approved the request that same day, recognizing that the circumstances
described in the application for relief “required immediate action to protect the
Fund’s security holders.”31

26. Joe Morris, Third Avenue CEO Out: Report, IGNITES (Dec. 14, 2015),
https://www.ignites.com/c/1255953/140173?referrer_module=searchSubFromIG&highlight=focu
sed%20credit%20liquidating%20trust (pointing out that the liquidation trust would not trade nor
charge a management fee, and would “make periodic payments to investors until the assets and any
investment gains from the liquidating portfolio [were] distributed.”); see Ptak, supra note 19.
Normally, when a fund company liquidates an open-end mutual fund, it provides advance
notice to shareholders, who are given the opportunity to redeem their investment up until
the liquidation date. During this interim period, the fund’s manager will typically sell
the portfolio’s holdings to raise cash, using the proceeds to pay out shareholders who
redeem their investments. On the liquidation date, the fund company makes a final prorata cash distribution to any remaining shareholders.
Id.
27. Kristen Bahler, Third Avenue Halts Redemptions of $778M Fund Amid Liquidation,
IGNITES (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.ignites.com/c/1255073/140123/third_avenue_halts_
redemptions_fund_amid_liquidation.
28. Third Avenue Trust and Third Avenue Management LLC; Notice of Application and
Temporary Order, Release No. IC-31943, 4 (Dec. 16, 2015) (herein the “Third Avenue Temporary
Order”) (stating that “[u]pon announcement of the Plan of Liquidation, the Commission staff
expressed concerns during discussions with the Fund and the Adviser.”). The Fund ultimately
decided to apply to the SEC for permission to suspend redemptions, cancel the use of the liquidating
trust, return all assets from the liquidating trust to the Fund. Id.
29. Id.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 270.0–5(a), (c) (2011).
31. Third Avenue Temporary Order, supra note 28, at 8; see Joe Morris, SEC Tweaks Third
Avenue Liquidation, IGNITES (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.ignites.com/c/1258313/140673?
referrer_module=searchSubFromIG&highlight=third%20avenue%20focused%20credit%20liquid
ating%20trust (pointing out that the SEC’s grant of relief was “conditional on Third Avenue’s
changing the fund’s plan of liquidation by transferring fund assets back to the fund from the
liquidating trust.”).
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II. ROADMAP
Beyond the timing coincidence between the SEC’s Proposal of Rule 22e-4
and Focused Credit’s liquidity crisis, the Fund’s downfall seems precisely the
kind scenario that Rule 22e-4 seeks to address.32 In fact, the Proposing Release
directly cited to the Fund’s meltdown as an example of the “adverse
consequences to remaining investors in a fund when it fails to adequately
manage liquidity.”33 This comment thus focuses on analyzing the SEC’s
Liquidity Rule with an emphasis on examining some of the liquidity issues that
the Fund faced in 2015, and ultimately assesses whether Rule 22e-4 provides
effective tools to prevent another open-end mutual fund from experiencing a
liquidity crisis such as that of Focused Credit.
Part III of this comment will examine the background and prior law by: (A)
discussing the importance of liquidity for open-end mutual funds; (B) examining
the type of credit instruments that were at the heart of the Fund’s investment
strategy and why they may pose special liquidity difficulties; (C) noting the roots
of the SEC’s concern regarding mutual funds’ liquidity; and (D) reviewing the
regulatory standards around liquidity for open-end funds that were in place
before Rule 22e-4 was proposed. Part III analyzes the tools in place under Rule
22e-4 to address liquidity risk. Part V hypothesizes as to the application and
likely benefits of the Liquidity Rule had it been in place during and prior to
Focused Credit’s collapse and describes how the Liquidity Rule provides a new
remedy for the SEC to bring enforcement action against persons who failed to
manage liquidity sufficiently. Lastly, Part VII provides commentary regarding
how recent market events related to the COVID-19 crisis might offer a good
opportunity to test the effectiveness of the Liquidity Rule.
III. PRIOR LAW
A. Liquidity and its Role in Mutual Funds
[L]iquidity” is a straw man. Whenever markets plunge, investors are
stunned to find that there are not enough buyers to go around . . . The
mistake is in thinking that markets have a duty to stay liquid, or that
buyers will always be present to accommodate sellers . . . If you aren’t
in debt, you can’t go broke and can’t be made to sell, in which case
“liquidity” is irrelevant. But [if a] . . . firm may be forced to sell, lest
fast-accumulating losses put it out of business.34
– Roger Lowenstein
32. Matt Wirz, et al., Junk Fund’s Demise Fuels Concern Over Bond Rout, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-high-yield-debt-reels-mutualfund-blocks-holders-from-redeeming-1449767526?mod=article_inline.
33. Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 62,280.
34. ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 42 (2000).
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Generally, “liquidity” is the “ability [to] sell an asset quickly” and turn it into
cash without causing a significant “drop in its value,” or in the case of investment
companies, without diluting the interest of remaining shareholders.35 For mutual
funds, liquidity is especially important because shareholders have the right to
redeem their shares in exchange for cash at any time, so funds must stand ready
to meet those redemptions by converting some of their assets into cash.36 Funds
must make the payment to shareholders within seven days of receiving the
redemption order, although investors often expect this timeframe to be less than
seven days, as a number of funds disclose in their prospectuses that they will pay
redemptions on a next-business-day basis.37 In fact, fund shares redeemed
through broker-dealers must be paid within as little as three business days
according to a rule under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38
To understand how redemptions may dilute the interest of remaining
shareholders in a mutual fund, it is key to examine the concept of per share Net
Asset Value (“NAV”) and how a shareholder’s interest is generally measured.
The per share NAV is the share price that a fund pays to a shareholder redeeming
his or her share, and it is equal to the fund’s total assets minus total liabilities,
divided by the number of shares outstanding.39 The per share NAV can be
thought of as the “fair market value of a share of the fund” and is calculated each
business day.40 A shareholder’s investment holding is then equal to “the [per
share] NAV times the number of fund shares held.”41
When a shareholder redeems his or her shares, if the fund is not holding
sufficient cash, it has to sell sufficient assets to be able to generate cash proceeds
to meet the redemption.42 If the fund does not receive its carrying value43 for
the liquidated assets, a drop in the per share NAV may occur, which, if deep
enough, would result in a decrease in the interest of the remaining fund
35. Liquidity, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 661 (Stephen Michael
Sheppard ed., Compact ed. 2011).
36. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 5–6; Anne M. Tucker & Holly van den Toorn, Will
Swing Pricing Save Sedentary Shareholders? 18 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 130, 135–36 (2018).
37. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1940); see Adopting Release
supra note 12, at 14–15.
38. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,143 n.8. (noting that “broker dealers are subject
to Rule 15c6-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . , which establishes a three-day . . .
settlement period for security trades effected by a broker or a dealer.”); see Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1996).
39. Net Asset Value, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: FAST ANSWERS,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/net-asset-value
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2019). The NAV is also the price that an investor pays to buy fund shares. Id.
40. Conrad Ciccotello, The Nature of Mutual Funds, in MUTUAL FUNDS: PORTFOLIO
STRUCTURES, ANALYSIS, MANAGEMENT, AND STEWARDSHIP 5 (John A. Haslem ed., 2010).
41. Tucker, supra 36, at 144.
42. Id. at 136.
43. Carrying
Value,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
carryingvalue.asp, (“an accounting measure of value in which the value of an asset . . . is based on
the figures in the respective company’s balance sheet”).
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shareholders (i.e. dilution).44 A dilution in the remaining shareholder’s interest
can be notably exacerbated when, a fund faces an outsized stream of
redemptions, lacks enough cash and cash equivalent holdings to meet them, and
its assets are difficult to convert into cash without having to do so at prices lower
than their carrying value on the fund’s books.45 Focused Credit seems to have
faced similar circumstances prior to its collapse.46
B. High-Yield Bond and Secured Loan Mutual Funds May Face Particular
Liquidity Challenges During Times of Economic Stress
Federal Reserve Research Staff members, Aylen Banegas and Jessica
Goldering, note that a number of mutual funds looking for higher yield have,
over the years, centered their investment strategies on investing in noninvestment-grade corporate debt, particularly in two types of credit instruments:
high-yield bonds and leveraged (secured) loans.47 Despite the fundamental
differences between these two types of credit instruments, the underlying
premise remains the same, that by financing companies with below-investmentgrade credit ratings, the funds will be able to get a higher yield in exchange for
bearing the greater credit risks associated with lending to such companies.48
However, as was the case with Focused Credit, mutual funds investing primarily
in high-yield bonds and secured loans can carry greater liquidity risks than funds
investing primarily in investment-grade debt, especially during times of
financial stress.49
1. High-Yield Bond Funds
Mutual funds’ investment in high-yield corporate bonds has grown
significantly since 2008, with overall assets under management at funds
investing primarily in these credit instruments increasing from around $75
billion to $225 billion as of December 2018.50 At its core, a corporate bond is a
debt obligation in which the company issuing the bond borrows money from an
investor by making a “legal commitment to pay interest on the principal” and
44. Tucker, supra note 36, at 144–45.
45. Dierking supra note 18; Ptak supra note 18; see id. at 144–46 (defining dilution, giving
an example based on hypothetical numbers, and providing further technical details on how funds
process shareholder redemptions).
46. See supra Section I.
47. Ayelen Banegas, Jessica Goldenring, Leveraged Bank Loan Versus High Yield Bond
Mutual Funds, Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Wash. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2 (2019).
48. Lisa Lee, How Leveraged Loans are (and Aren’t) Like Junk Bonds: Quick Take,
BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-30/howleveraged-loans-are-and-aren-t-like-junk-bonds-quicktake.
49. Kenechukwu Anadu & Fang Cai, Liquidity Transformation Risks in U.S. Bank Loan and
High-Yield Mutual Funds, WASHINGTON: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: FEDS NOTES (Aug. 9, 2019), https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2412.
50. Banegas & Goldenring, supra note 47, at 2.
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“return the principal when the bond comes due[.]”51 Companies that face greater
financial difficulties can issue high-yield corporate bonds, offering to pay higher
interest rates to compensate for the higher risk of the company defaulting on its
debt.52 Credit rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch give
the bonds credit ratings based on the issuer’s ability to make the scheduled
payments, giving lower ratings to high-yield bonds, as the payment of interest
and repayment of principal is considered more speculative than for bond
issuances considered “investment grade.”53
Commentary from investment management firms states that when the
economy is strong, high-yield bonds are considered fairly liquid (readily
tradeable) as higher yields entice investors.54 Such commentary also notes that
even under less positive economic conditions, high-yield bonds may still
“present value opportunities for funds . . . structured to take advantage of them,
with longer lock-ups for investor capital [i.e. closed-end funds], for instance.”55
However, as Federal Reserve researchers, Kenechukwu Anadu and Fang Cai,
point out, mutual funds investing primarily in high-yield bonds may face
particularly challenging liquidity conditions during economic downturns
because “large redemptions . . . could lead to asset fire sales” and, unlike closedend funds, mutual funds must stand ready to meet redemptions.56
During economic downturns, Federal Reserve researcher Simon Kwan notes,
companies with low credit quality issuing high-yield bonds are more vulnerable
and face more challenges meeting their debt obligations, which raises their risk
of default.57 This in turn could cause investors in high-yield bond funds to want
to exit the market by redeeming their shares.58 The problem then, Kwan points
51. Investor Bulletin: What are High Yield Corporate Bonds?, SEC OFFICE OF INVESTOR
EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY, 1 (June 2013), https://www.sec.gov/files/ib_high-yield.pdf.
52. Id.
53. High Yield Bonds, PIMCO: UNDERSTANDING INVESTING, https://www.pimco.com/enus/resources/education/understanding-high-yield-bonds/ (last visited Oct. 31, 3019). See Bond
Ratings, CORPORATE FINANCE INSTITUTE, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/trading-investing/bond-ratings/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (stating that “credit rating
agencies . . . provide evaluations of a bond issuer’s financial strength and capacity to repay the
bond’s principal and interest according to the contract.”).
54. Who Owns the Assets? A Closer Look at Bank Loans, High Yield Bonds and Emerging
Market Debt, BLACKROCK: VIEWPOINT 10 (Sept. 2014), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/
en-fi/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-closer-look-selected-asset- classes-sept2014.pdf.
55. Neuberger Berman, High Yield Liquidity: High and Dry?, NASDAQ (May 10, 2016 1:59
AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/high-yield-liquidity-high-and-dry-2016-05-10 (suggesting
that even in “less liquid parts of the high-yield universe,” i.e., CCC-rated bonds, there are “value
opportunities for patient capital in appropriate fund structures.”).
56. Anadu & Cai, supra note 49.
57. Simon Kwan, Rising Junk Bond Yields: Liquidity or Credit Concerns?, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTER, No. 2001–33 (Nov. 16, 2001).
58. Id.; see Anadu & Cai, supra note 49 (noting that “[f]or example, in December 2018, amid
heightened financial market volatility, . . . [high-yield bond mutual funds] experienced net outflows
of $6 billion,” stemming from redemptions).
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out, is that funds investing primarily in high-yield bonds could be left without
enough liquid assets to meet potential large waves of redemptions, so they would
have to sell the bonds in a market with few buyers willing to take on such risk,
thus forcing the funds to lower the price to lure buyers.59 This seems to be
precisely what Focused Credit faced, as it reportedly lacked enough liquid assets
to cover its redemption obligations, and sought to halt investor redemptions to
avoid selling its assets at fire sale prices, which risked diluting the interest of the
remaining shareholders in the fund.60
2. Secured Loans
Secured loans in the high-yield world, on the other hand, are loans that banks
usually make to companies with below-investment-grade credit rating, but
instead of keeping the loan on their books, the banks sell all or a portion of the
loans to institutional investors or mutual funds.61 The loan is typically secured
(backed) by the borrowing company’s physical or other assets, and the investors
earn a floating interest rate, which “increases as the loan gets riskier.”62 Mutual
funds investing in secured loans face the same liquidity concerns as those
investing in high-yield bonds, regarding periods of economic stress, borrowers’
risk of default and the potential for outsized redemptions that may force funds
to sell – in this case – loans at fire sale prices.63
Federal Reserve researchers suggest, however, that secured loans’ settlement
period represents an additional concern for mutual funds’ liquidity, as their
settlement time may well be past the seven days in which funds must pay out
shareholder redemptions.64 Prior to the Liquidity Rule Proposal, SEC
Commissioner Stein suggested that “it is reasonable to wonder how [a] fund
[investing in bank loans] could possibly meet the seven day redemption
requirement in the Investment Company Act in times of market stress.”65 It
takes even longer for a loan to settle, that is, for the fund to receive payment
from the loan’s buyer in exchange for transferring the asset than it does for
“fixed income securities such as high yield bonds [to settle], which typically
59. Kwan, supra note 57.
60. Bahler, supra note 27; see supra Section III.A.
61. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan
Market, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 725, 727 (2014).
62. Lee, supra note 48 (pointing out that the interest rate on secured loans is equal to the Libor
benchmark rate plus a fixed “margin” interest).
63. Anadu & Cai, supra note 49.
64. Id. (noting that “the mean par settlement time [for secured loans] was approximately 17
business days as of March 2019.”).
65. Kara M. Stein, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Speech at the
Brookings Institution: Mutual Funds — The Next 75 Years (June 15, 2015); but see Loan Mutual
Fund Liquidity Risk Management: A Case Study, LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASSOCIATION
(May
14,
2019),
https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/loan-mutual-fund-liquidity-riskmanagement-a-case-study/ (asserting that “nearly all loan mutual funds have lines of credit that
bridge the gap between the sale and settlement of loan assets”).
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settle in three days.”66 Such a long settlement period “further constrains [bank
loan mutual funds’] ability to quickly convert their loans into cash to meet large
redemptions.”67
C. The Roots of Mutual Fund Liquidity Concerns
As a response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, Congress enacted the Dodd
Frank Act, which established the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”) to “identify risks” and “respond to emerging threats” “to the financial
stability of the United States.”68 In 2014, FSOC seemed to be concerned that the
nature of redeemable mutual funds could exacerbate stress in the markets, and
as part of its mission, it issued a notice seeking public comment on “whether
asset management products and activities may pose potential risks to the U.S.
financial system.”69 Specifically, FSOC sought to explore “whether investments
through pooled investment vehicles that provide redemption rights, as well as
their management of liquidity risks and redemptions, could potentially influence
investor behavior in a way that could affect U.S. financial stability differently
than direct investment.” 70
FSOC’s initial push to assess liquidity risk in the asset management industry
seems to have ignited the SEC’s concerns regarding mutual funds’ liquidity.
SEC Chair Mary Jo White, as a FSOC member, first welcomed FSOC’s request
for comment and noted that it was “a constructive complement to the SEC’s
initiatives.”71 Then in September 2015, the SEC’s Division of Economic Risk
Analysis (DERA) conducted an independent study which observed that funds
when facing redemptions, may sell their most liquid holdings first, which could
increase funds’ risk profile for remaining shareholders.72 Unsurprisingly, the
Rule 22e-4 Proposing Release, despite stating the “rulemaking proposal [was]
66. BlackRock, supra note 54; see Julia Kagan, Settlement Date, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/settlementdate.asp (last updated June 22, 2019).
67. Anadu & Cai, supra note 49; but see LOAN SYNDICATIONS & TRADING ASSOCIATION,
supra note 65 (suggesting that, after polling some loan mutual fund managers about their approach
to the market turmoil of 2018, they mentioned having “used their long experience to successfully
predict redemption patterns in normal and stressed environments . . . and sell loans (and settle those
sales) well ahead of redemptions.”).
68. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 20 (2010) (Conf. Rep.); 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (a)(1)(A), (C) (2018).
69. Financial Stability Oversight Council, Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management
Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,488 (Dec. 24, 2014).
70. Id. at 77,490.
71. Minutes of the Financial Stability Oversight Council 1, 12 (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/December%2018%2C%202014%2C%20Meeting%20
Minutes.pdf.
72. Proposing Release, supra note 8 at 62,279; Paul Hanouna, et al., Liquidity and Flows of
U.S. Mutual Funds, DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/liquidity-white-paper-09-2015.pdf
(noting
that “all investors who redeem from a mutual fund during the day transact at the fund’s end-of-day
NAV. . . .The costs of providing liquidity to investors are partially or entirely borne by the nonredeeming investors.”).
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independent of FSOC,” addressed many of the industry comments responding
to FSOC’s notice, and discussed DERA’s findings as part of the economic
analysis.73 Ultimately, the SEC noted that, as the primary regulator for the
securities industry, it was proposing rules that aimed at “mitigating the adverse
effects that liquidity risk in funds can have on investors and the fair, efficient
and orderly operation of the markets”; and that “[t]o the extent there are any
potential financial stability risks from poor fund liquidity management, [the]
proposal may mitigate those risks as well.”74
D. Regulatory Standards Around Liquidity for Mutual Funds Prior to Rule
22e-4
Before the SEC adopted Rule 22e-4, there were several statutory and
regulatory provisions intended to ensure that mutual funds, like Focused Credit,
maintained enough liquidity to meet redemptions without diluting shareholder’s
interests.75 Under Section 22(e) of the 1940 Act, open-end mutual funds cannot
“suspend the right of redemption or postpone the date of payment of redemption
proceeds for more than seven days after tender of the security absent specified
unusual circumstances.”76 Rule 22c-1 under the 1940 Act “requires funds, their
principal underwriters, and dealers to sell and redeem fund shares at a price
based on the current NAV next computed after receipt of an order to purchase
or redeem fund shares,” even if the fund needs to sell assets in the following
days to meet the redemptions.77
Further, per “[R]ule 15c6-1 under the Exchange Act . . . broker-dealers [must]
settle securities transactions, including transactions in open-end fund shares,
within three business days after the trade date[,]” which means that funds must
be able to pay such redemptions within that three-day settlement period.78 The
SEC had repeatedly clarified its position, that a fund “should maintain a high
degree of portfolio liquidity,” monitor its portfolio liquidity regularly to ensure
73. Proposing Release, supra note 8 at 62,281.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 62,277, 62,279.
76. Id. at 62,283. Funds may suspend the right of redemption:
Section 22(e) permits open-end funds to suspend redemptions and postpone payment for
redemptions already tendered for any period during which the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”) is closed (other than customary weekend and holiday closings) and in three additional
situations if the Commission has made certain determinations. First, a fund may suspend
redemptions for any period during which trading on the NYSE is restricted, as determined by the
Commission. Second, a fund may suspend redemptions for any period during which an emergency
exists, as determined by the Commission, as a result of which it is not reasonably practicable for
the fund to: (i) liquidate its portfolio securities, or (ii) fairly determine the value of its net assets.
Third, a fund may suspend redemptions for such other periods as the Commission may by order
permit for the protection of fund shareholders.
Id. at 62,283 n.82.
77. Id. at 62,283.
78. Id. at 62,287 n.109; see Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1(a) (1996).
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that it is able to meet redemptions, and take steps if it determines that it lacks
sufficient liquidity or that its previously liquid holdings have become illiquid.79
Lastly, while the SEC had never required “funds to invest in a minimum level
of liquid assets,” the SEC guidelines limited mutual funds “holdings of ‘illiquid
assets’ to 15% of the fund’s net assets (the ‘15% guideline’).”80 Under the ‘15%
guideline’, the SEC deemed a security to be “illiquid” if the fund could not sell
or dispose of it “in the ordinary course of business within seven days at
approximately the value at which the fund ha[d] valued the investment.” 81
The ‘15% guideline’ had prompted funds to limit their exposures to certain
types of securities that the SEC indicated may be “illiquid.”82 However, former
Commissioner Stein believed that the guideline “ha[d] arguably become more
of a compliance exercise than a true restriction,” asserting that some mutual
funds’ large holdings of what she referred to as “illiquid bank loans, . . . would
seemingly violate the 15% threshold.”83 Former Commissioner Stein thus
suggested that funds seemed to have found a way around the ‘15% guideline’,
by relying on the interpretation that “rather than requiring the settlement of a
sales transaction within seven days, the Commission’s liquidity standard
requires only that a contract price be struck.”84
IV. ANALYSIS
The SEC adopted Rule 22e-4 under the 1940 Act on October 13, 2016,
requiring each fund, for the first time, to “adopt and implement a written
liquidity risk management program (‘Program’) that is reasonably designed to
assess and manage its liquidity risk.”85
The Adopting Release laid out a “tiered set of compliance dates based on asset
size” whereby large fund complexes (with $1 billion or more in net assets) had
to adopt a Liquidity Risk Management Program by December 1, 2018, and
smaller fund complexes (with less than $1 billion net assets) by June 1, 2019.86
79. Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 62,284.
80. Id. at 62,351–352.
81. Id. at 62,352.
82. Id.
83. Commissioner Stein, Speech at the Brookings Institution, supra note 65.
84. Id. at n.26 (citing Investment Company Institute (ICI), Valuation and Liquidity Issues for
Mutual Funds (1997)).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(b) (2019); Adopting Release, supra note 12 at 82,229–230 (stating
that the Liquidity Rule’s primary goals are to: “[(1)] promote investor protection by reducing the
risk that funds will be unable to meet their redemption obligations, [(2)] elevate the overall quality
of liquidity risk management . . . , [(3)] increase transparency of funds’ liquidity risks and risk
management practices, and [(4)] mitigate potential dilution of non-transacting shareholders’
interests.”).
86. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,228–82,229; see John M. Baker and Joel D.
Corriero, Fund Alert: What You Need to Know About the SEC’s New Liquidity Risk Management
Rule, STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP, 21–22 (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.stradley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2016/Fund_Alert_November_2_2016.pdf.
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The SEC later extended the compliance dates for three of the Liquidity Rule’s
provisions: the liquidity classification requirement,87 the Highly Liquid
Investment Minimum (“HLIM”),88 and the Board’s approval of the liquidity risk
management program.89 Compliance with these key provisions was then set out
to be June 1, 2019 for large fund complexes, and December 1, 2019 for smaller
fund complexes.90
Section IV.A. discusses the Liquidity Risk Management Program’s main
tools, and Section IV.B. describes the liquidity disclosure regime that the SEC
adopted parallel to Rule 22e-4.
A. Tools for Liquidity Risk Management Under Rule 22e-4
Per Rule 22e-4, the Program must contain the following key elements: (i)
liquidity risk assessment and management; (ii) classification of investments into
four buckets of liquidity; (iii) for some funds, determination of the minimum
percentage that the fund must invest in highly liquid investments; (iv) limitation
on the acquisition of illiquid investments, and (v) careful board oversight.91
Under the Liquidity Rule, the fund’s board of directors, including a majority
of independent directors, must approve the designation of the person(s)
responsible for administering the Program as well as its policies and procedures
(“Program Administrator”).92 The Program Administrator has a number of
specific responsibilities such as providing the fund’s board of directors with a
written report: (1) on the adequacy and effectiveness of the Program93; (2) if
there is a highly liquid investment minimum shortfall,94 and (3) if the fund holds
more than fifteen percent of its net assets in illiquid investments.95

(clarifying that per the final rule, a fund’s board must have approved the “[c]ompliance policies
and procedures that satisfy the requirements of Rule 22e-4, . . . on or before the applicable
compliance date.”).
87. See infra Section IV.A.2.
88. See infra Section IV.A.3.
89. Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Commission Guidance for
In-Kind ETFs, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,010, 83 Fed. Reg. 8342 (Feb. 27, 2018)
[hereinafter the “Compliance Date Extension Release”]; see infra Section IV.A.5.
90. Compliance Date Extension Release, supra note 89.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(b).
92. § 270.22e-4(b)(2)(ii); see also (a)(13) (stating that the Program Administrator may be the
fund’s “investment adviser, officer, or officers” but an individual that is solely the portfolio
manager of the fund may not act as Program Administrator).
93. § 270.22e-4(b)(2)(iii) (stating that reporting on the Program’s “adequacy and
effectiveness” includes discussing, if applicable, “the operation of the highly liquid investment
minimum, and any material changes to the program”).
94. See infra Section IV.A.3.
95. See infra Section IV.A.4.

2021]

Can the Liquidity Rule Keep Mutual Funds Afloat?

331

1. Liquidity Risk Assessment
The Liquidity Rule defines “liquidity risk” as “the risk that the fund could not
meet requests to redeem shares issued by the fund without significant dilution
of remaining investors’ interests in the fund.”96 Through the Program, a fund
must “assess, manage and periodically review” (no less frequently than
annually) its “liquidity risk,” considering the following Liquidity Risk Factors.97
a. Liquidity Risk Factors
When assessing, managing, and reviewing its liquidity risk, a fund must
consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors, as applicable:
(A) [I]nvestment strategy and liquidity of portfolio investments during
both normal and reasonably foreseeable stressed conditions . . . ; (B)
Short-term and long-term cash flow projections during both normal
and reasonably foreseeable stressed conditions; [and] (C) Holdings of
cash and cash equivalents, as well as borrowing arrangements and
other funding sources[.]98
b. Review of Investment Strategy and Portfolio Liquidity
Under the Liquidity Rule, evaluating the fund’s investment strategy includes
considering: “[(1)] whether the investment strategy is appropriate for an openend fund, [(2) includes] a relatively concentrated portfolio or large positions in
particular issuers,99 and [(3)] the use of borrowings for investment purposes and
derivatives.”100

96. § 270.22e-4(a)(11); Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,158; see Jeffrey S. Puretz, et
al., Drowning in Liquidity: The SEC’s New Liquidity Management Rule for Mutual Funds (Part 1),
THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 43 (June 1, 2019) (noting that the Liquidity Rule’s definition of
“liquidity risk” suggests that a fund must consider not just the possibility that it is unable to meet
redemption requests entirely, but also “the method(s) by which portfolio assets may be sold for the
purpose of meeting shareholder redemptions, so as to seek to avoid a potentially significant dilution
in value or a significant change in risk profile for remaining investors’ interests.”).
97. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,157–158.
98. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(i); Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,160–162 (stating that the
Liquidity Risk Factors are non-exhaustive and rather serve as a “baseline,” as the SEC sought to
leave room for a fund to consider additional factors it thought necessary for evaluating its liquidity).
99. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(i)(A); Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,162 (pointing out that a
relatively concentrated portfolio (i.e. less diversified) might limit the choice of investments that the
fund is able to sell in case it needs cash to cover redemptions, which might in turn force the fund
to sell the securities in unfavorable markets).
100. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(i)(A); see Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 62,308–09, n. 321
(noting that under Section 18 of the Investment Company Act, some ways in which a fund can
borrow are: (1) from a bank, subject to the terms agreed to with the bank, including those related
to the loan’s repayment and maturity date, and as long as it maintains a percentage of asset coverage
(at least 300% for all borrowings of the fund); or (2) through financing transactions like reverse
repurchase agreements, firm commitment agreements or standby commitments, which, generally
requires fund to segregate liquid assets).
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In particular, the Adopting Release notes that requiring a fund to consider
whether its investment strategy is appropriate for an open-end structure is a key
tool for liquidity risk management, as it is likely to lead funds “to evaluate the
suitability of investment strategies” that involve significant liquidity risk even if
permitted under the fifteen percent illiquid investment requirement.101 This
assessment for example, might lead a fund to reconsider the suitability of
investing in securities “so sensitive to stressed conditions” that the fund may not
find a buyer when selling them under such conditions.102 Similarly, the
Adopting Release noted that funds investing primarily in securities with
settlement periods longer than seven days (e.g. Secured loans) may not be
operating under the proper structure, as they might not be able to meet
redemptions within the seven days required by the 1940 Act.103
c. Cash Flow Projections
In assessing its cash flow projections, the Adopting Release highlights five
factors that a fund should consider, including: “(i) the size, frequency, and
volatility of historical purchases and redemptions of fund shares during normal
and reasonably foreseeable stressed periods, (ii) the fund’s redemption policies,
(iii) the fund’s shareholder ownership concentration, (iv) the fund’s distribution
channels, and (v) the degree of certainty associated with the fund’s short-term
and long-term cash flow projections.”104
d. Holdings of Cash and Borrowing Arrangements
Lastly, in its liquidity risk assessment, a fund must consider its cash and cash
equivalents as well as borrowing arrangements. The Adopting Release notes
that these holdings and arrangements give flexibility to the fund’s investment
adviser to “readjust its portfolio [in case of] . . . changing market circumstances,”
helping the fund “meet some redemption requests without significant dilution of
remaining investors’ interests.”105 Further, borrowing arrangements could help
the fund meet redemption requests when necessary by, for instance, bridging
timing mismatches between redemption obligations and the realization of sales
initially made to pay for redemptions.106

101. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,162 (illustrating “if a fund’s illiquid investments
exceed 15% of net assets, this could indicate that the fund is encountering liquidity pressures that
could significantly impair [its] ability to meet its redemption and other legal obligations.”); §
270.22e-4(a)(11). See infra Section IV.A.4.
102. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,162.
103. Id. at 82,169–170; see § 270.22e-4(a)(8) (defining “illiquid investment”).
104. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,164–165.
105. Id. at 82,166.
106. Id.
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2. Classifying the Liquidity of Fund Investment
At the core of the Liquidity Risk Management Program is the requirement that
a fund classifies its portfolio holdings into one of four liquidity categories, based
on the number of days that “it reasonably expects an investment [to] be
convertible to cash” “or, in the case of the less-liquid and illiquid categories,” to
sell the investment, “without . . . significantly changing” its market value.107 The
liquidity categories are as follows:
(1) “Highly Liquid Investment” defined as “any cash held by a fund
and any investment that the fund reasonably expects to be convertible
into cash in current market conditions in three business days or less[;]”
(2) “Moderately Liquid Investment” defined as “any investment that
the fund reasonably expects to be convertible into cash in current
market conditions in more than three calendar days but in seven
calendar days or less[;]”
(3) “Less Liquid Investment” defined as “any investment that the fund
reasonably expects to be able to sell or dispose of in current market
conditions in seven calendar days or less . . . but where the sale . . . is
reasonably expected to settle in more than seven calendar days[;]”
(4) “Illiquid Investment” defined as “any investment that the fund
reasonably expects cannot be sold or disposed of in current market
conditions in seven calendar days or less.”108
Per the Adopting Release, funds have the discretion to determine whether to
classify portfolio holdings on an investment-by-investment basis, or “according
to their asset class.”109 Nevertheless, the SEC stipulates that a fund must classify
the investment individually (instead of on an asset-class basis), “if the fund or
its adviser has information about any market, trading, or investment-specific
considerations . . . reasonably expected to significantly affect the liquidity
characteristics of that investment” when compared to other holdings in the same
asset class.110 This exception to the ability to classify with reference to asset
class connotes the need for some level of micro analysis on a security-bysecurity basis.

107. Id. at 82,167–168; see § 270.22e-4(a)(3) (stating that under the Liquidity Rule, an
investment is “convertible into cash” when it can “be sold, with the sale settled.”).
108. §§ 270.22e-4(a)(6), (8), (10), (12).
109. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(ii)(A).
110. Id.; Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,265 (stating that examples of such information
include knowledge that: (1) the liquidity characteristics of a large-capitalization equity security
were affected and made different from those of the asset class as a whole, because of adverse events
impacting the security’s issuer; and (2) the bid-ask spread of certain high-quality corporate bonds
was “significantly wider or more volatile than those of their peers[.]”).

334

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.2:1

a. Classification Procedures
With regards to a fund’s procedures for classifying investments on an asset
class basis, these must include “sufficient detail to meaningfully distinguish
between asset classes and sub-classes” (i.e., Should avoid categories that are too
general such as “equities” or “fixed income”).111 Further, in classifying
investments, whether on an asset-class basis or investment-by-investment basis,
the fund must consider “relevant market, trading, and investment-specific
considerations,” based on “information obtained after reasonable inquiry.”112
The fund is also required to consider an investment’s “market depth,”113 and the
Adopting Release provided nine additional factors that funds “may consider” in
classifying their investments but which are not required under the Liquidity
Rule.114
Rule 22e-4 also requires a fund to “identify the percentage of [its] highly
liquid investments that it has segregated to cover, or pledged to satisfy margin
requirements in connection with, derivative transactions[,]” which “the fund has
classified as moderately liquid investments, less liquid investments, and illiquid

111. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 103, 82,180–181 (noting that, for instance, certain
assets could be sub-classified as follows: (a) “equity securities” based on “the market(s) in which
the security’s issuer is based, market capitalization, and whether the security is common or
preferred stock[;]” (b) “fixed income securities” based on “issuer type, the market(s) in which the
issuer is based, seniority, age, and credit quality[;]” and (c) “structured products based on tranche
seniority and credit quality.”).
112. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(ii); Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,171 (noting that the SEC
found it important for funds to consider such market information, as opposed to just taking into
account the “structural characteristics of an investment,” since doing so would prevent the
possibility of overlooking the fund’s “actual ability to sell” an investment “without significant
dilution.”).
113. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,168 n.281 (defining “market depth” as the extent
to which “trading varying portions of a position in a particular investment, in sizes that the fund
would reasonably anticipate trading, is reasonably expected to significantly affect the liquidity of
that investment.”).
114. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,170 n.313. The following factors serve as
guidance in evaluating portfolio investments liquidity characteristics:
(1) existence of an active market for the asset, including whether the asset is listed on an
exchange, as well as the number, diversity, and quality of market participants; (2)
frequency of trades or quotes for the asset and average daily trading volume of the asset
(regardless of whether the asset is a security traded on an exchange); (3) volatility of
trading prices for the asset; (4) bid-ask spreads for the asset; (5) whether the asset has a
relatively standardized and simple structure; (6) for fixed income securities, maturity and
date of issue; (7) restrictions on trading of the asset and limitations on transfer of the
asset; (8) the size of the fund’s position in the asset relative to the asset’s average daily
trading volume and, as applicable, the number of units of the asset outstanding; and (9)
relationship of the asset to another portfolio asset.
Id.
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investments[.]”115 The fund must then “disclose these percentages on its Form
N-PORT filings.” 116
Lastly, under Rule 22e-4 “a fund must review its portfolio investments’
classifications at least monthly” in connection with its Form N-PORT liquidity
classification reporting, and “more frequently if changes in relevant market,
trading, and investment-specific considerations are reasonably expected to
materially affect one or more of its investments’ classifications.”117
3. Highly Liquid Investment Minimum (HLIM)
Another key aspect of the Liquidity Risk Management Program is the
introduction of the concept of a fund’s “highly liquid investment minimum”
(“HLIM”), that is, the minimum “percentage of the fund’s net assets that the
fund invests in highly liquid investments that are assets.”118 Under Rule 22e-4,
“any fund that does not primarily hold assets that are highly liquid investments”
is required to: (1) determine a HLIM, taking into account the Liquidity Risk
Factors119 as applied to the fund; (2) review the HLIM periodically and “no less
frequently than annually;” and (3) “adopt and implement policies and procedures
for responding to a shortfall of the fund’s highly liquid investments below its”
HLIM (i.e. an HLIM shortfall).120
As some practitioners have interpreted, the Liquidity Rule does not seem to
require the HLIM to be approved by the board of directors,121 nor “prohibit[]
[the fund] from acquiring assets that are not highly liquid when a shortfall
occurs.”122 Nevertheless, the HLIM “may not be changed during any period of
time” in which there is an HLIM shortfall, “without approval from the fund’s
board of directors, including a majority” of independent directors.123
a. Responding to a HLIM Shortfall
Under the Liquidity Rule, the “policies and procedures” needed for
responding to a HLIM shortfall “must include requiring the [Program
Administrator] to report to the fund’s board of directors no later than its next
regularly scheduled meeting with a brief explanation of the causes of the
shortfall, the extent of the shortfall, and any actions taken in response.”124
115. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(ii)(C).
116. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,182 (noting that such reporting aims at informing
both the SEC and the public that some of the fund’s “highly liquid investments” are encumbered
or otherwise “may not be immediately available for liquidity risk management purposes.”).
117. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(ii).
118. § 270.22e-4 (a)(7).
119. See supra Section IV.A.1.a.
120. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iii)(A).
121. Puretz, supra note 96, at 46.
122. Baker & Corriero, supra note 86, at 4–5.
123. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iii)(A)(1).
124. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iii)(A)(3).
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Further, “if the shortfall lasts more than 7 consecutive calendar days,” the
policies and procedures must require the Program Administrator “to report to
the board within one business day thereafter with an explanation of how the fund
plans to restore its minimum within a reasonable period of time.”125
4. Limitation on Funds Illiquid Investments
Under the Liquidity Rule, a fund may not “acquire any [additional] illiquid
investment if, immediately after the acquisition, the fund . . . would have
invested more than [fifteen percent] of its net assets in illiquid investments that
are assets.”126 As the Adopting Release suggested, this key provision aims to
“increase the likelihood that a fund’s portfolio is not concentrated in investments
whose liquidity is extremely limited, and thus will serve as an across-the-board
limit on fund illiquidity.”127
Moreover, “if a fund . . . holds more than [fifteen percent] of its net assets in
illiquid investments” the Program Administrator must report to the board
“within one business day” of exceeding the fifteen percent limit, “with an
explanation of the extent and causes of the occurrence and how the fund . . .
plans to bring its illiquid investments that are assets to or below” the limit.128
If the fund continues to exceed the fifteen percent illiquid investment limit
after “30 days from the occurrence,” the board must assess whether the plan that
the program administrator had presented (to bring the illiquid investments to or
below the fifteen percent limit) “continues to be in the best interest of the
fund[.]”129
5. Board Oversight
Per the Liquidity Rule, “a fund[‘s] . . . board of directors, including a majority
of” independent directors, must:
(i) Initially approve the liquidity risk management program; (ii)
Approve the designation of the [Program Administrator]; and (iii)
Review, no less frequently than annually, a written report prepared by
the [Program Administrator] that addresses the operation of the
program and assesses its adequacy and effectiveness of
implementation, including, if applicable, the operation of the [HLIM]
and any material changes to the program.130
Additionally, as previously discussed, the Liquidity Rule affords the board
two more instances in which to exercise oversight power, as it must: (1) approve

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
§ 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iv).
Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,208.
§ 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iv)(A).
§ 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iv)(B).
§ 270.22e-4(b)(2).
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changes to the HLIM if implemented during an HLIM shortfall;131 and (2) if the
fund has exceeded the fifteen percent limit on illiquid investments during more
than 30 days, determine if the Program Administrator’s plan for reducing illiquid
investments continues to be in the fund’s best interest.132
B. Liquidity Disclosure Regime Post Amendments
The SEC also implemented notable policy changes with the Liquidity Rule
and form amendments for modernizing mutual funds’ reporting and disclosure
regimes, as there was no prior requirement on funds to expressly disclose how
they managed their liquidity.133 Such reforms were designed to “increase the
transparency of fund portfolios and investment practices both to the Commission
and to investors.”134 The reporting and disclosure requirements adopted were
the following:
1. Form N-LIQUID
The SEC adopted new Rule 30b1-10, requiring all mutual funds (except for
money market funds) to “file . . . a . . . [non-public] report on Form N-LIQUID,”
within one business day of any of the following liquidity related occurrences:
(1) if the fund exceeds the fifteen percent limitation on illiquid investments; (2)
if it returns to compliance with the illiquid investments limitation; and (3) if the
fund’s highly liquid investments fall below the established minimum (HLIM)
for more than seven consecutive calendar days.135
2. Amendments to Form N-PORT
On new Form N-PORT, adopted concurrently with Rule 22e-4, funds are
required to report on a monthly basis: (1) the liquidity classification for each
investment;136 (2) the “aggregate percentage of its portfolio” that falls in “each
of the four [liquidity] classification categories”;137 (3) the fund’s HLIM (if
applicable);138 and (4) “the percentage of the fund’s highly liquid investments
that is segregated to cover, or pledged to satisfy margin requirements in
connection with [the] fund’s derivative transactions[.]”139
131. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iii)(A)(3); see supra Section IV.A.3.
132. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(iv)(B).
133. Baker & Corriero, supra note 86, at 19.
134. Investment Company Reporting Modernization, Release No. IC-21314, 81 Fed. Reg.
81,870, 81,872 (Nov. 18, 2016) (hereinafter “Reporting Modernization Release”).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-10 (2020); see Form N-LIQUID, General Instructions, Part B, Part
C, Part D.
136. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(ii).
137. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,196 (noting that the fund only needs to publicly
disclose its aggregate levels of liquidity “for the third month of each fiscal quarter with a 60-day
delay”).
138. Id. at 82,257; see Form N-PORT, Item B.7.
139. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,257; see Form N-PORT, Item C.7.
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3. Amendments to Form N-CEN
Lastly, on new Form N-CEN, the SEC requires funds to disclose information
about the fund’s committed and uncommitted lines of credit, their size, number
of days used, institution with which a line of credit is held, and whether the fund
engaged in interfund lending or borrowing.140 The SEC estimates that such
information would “facilitate [its] oversight of funds and its ability to monitor
trends and risks.”141
As one Commentator to the Liquidity Rule Proposal noted, such increased
reporting and disclosure requirements could help the SEC “monitor fund
holdings and liquidity determinations, examine potential outliers, and if an
unexpected market event occurs (e.g. the default of a significant institution),
quickly assess the potential impact on mutual funds it [regulates].”142
V. COMMENT
A. Rule 22e-4 Presents Effective Mechanisms to Prevent a Focused CreditType of Mutual Fund Meltdown
Considering the tools that the Liquidity Rule provides as described herein, the
question then becomes whether they would make a difference in preventing a
liquidity meltdown like the one Focused Credit faced. To answer such inquiry,
this comment hypothesizes as to the likely application of some of the key
provisions of Rule 22e-4 to Focused Credit’s facts and circumstances, had the
Liquidity Rule been in place during and prior to the Fund’s collapse. This a
limited approach, especially given the complexity of implementing all the
systems and processes required under the Rule. However, such exercise
illustrates how some of the Liquidity Rule’s provisions may have helped prevent
Focused Credit’s downfall, especially by providing earlier warnings about the
Fund’s liquidity issues and presenting new tools to address them.
1. Focused Credit’s Liquidity Risk Management Program
At the outset, the Liquidity Rule would have required Focused Credit to
implement a written Liquidity Risk Management Program to assess, manage and
review its liquidity risk (at least annually).143 Likewise, the Fund had to
designate, with the board’s approval, the person(s) who would administer the
Program and provide written reports to the board about the Program’s operation,
about material changes to the Program, and about the operation of the HLIM.144
140. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,260; see Form N-CEN, Item C.20.
141. Id.
142. J.P. Morgan Asset Management, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Mutual Funds
Liquidity Risk Management 9 (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-15/s7161567.pdf [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Comment Letter].
143. § 270.22e-4(b)(1); see supra Section IV.A.1.
144. § 270.22e-4(a)(13), (b)(2); see supra Sections IV.A.1., IV.A.3.
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These two initial requirements contrast with what the Fund appeared to have
in place according to its Quarterly Reports, where it barely discussed its liquidity
and made no mention of any program or specific plan to manage its liquidity
risk.145 The Adviser to the fund complex indeed established a “Valuation
Committee” responsible for “fair value and liquidity determinations” for all five
funds, including Focused Credit.146 However, valuation is itself a significant
responsibility for a fund group, particularly where, as here, market quotations
are not readily available for a fund’s holdings. The implementation of a Program
exclusively focused on liquidity and designation of a Program Administrator
exclusively for the Fund may have benefitted it through increased internal
scrutiny and a more personalized approach to its liquidity risk management.
Then, in assessing its liquidity risk, among the various factors that the SEC
highlighted for funds to consider, Focused Credit may have particularly
benefitted from reviewing its “investment strategy and liquidity of portfolio
investments during both normal and reasonably foreseeable stressed
conditions.”147 This review may have yielded preliminary warnings about
potential shortcomings in the Fund’s liquidity management.
a. Review of Investment Strategy
To review its investment strategy, Focused Credit would have assessed (at the
very least), whether such strategy (a) was “appropriate for an open-end fund,”
(b) “involve[d] a relatively concentrated portfolio or large positions in particular
issuers,” and (c) the extent to which it used “borrowings for investment purposes
and derivatives.”148
First, in assessing whether its investment strategy was appropriate for an
open-end fund, Focused Credit might have, for instance, considered the fact that
its strategy included investing “a substantial amount of its assets in credit
instruments that are rated below investment grade,” like “unrated” high-yield
bonds, and other credit instrument such as secured loans.149 As was discussed in
Section II, such investment strategy might prove worrisome for a mutual fund
like Focused Credit, which had to stand ready to meet shareholder redemptions,
and during times of economic stress could be forced to sell its assets at fire sale
prices just to cover redemptions. The Fund’s board may have considered
whether a different form of fund organization, such as a closed-end or interval
fund format, would have been more appropriate for the Fund’s strategies.
145. See, e.g., THIRD AVENUE FUNDS, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 38, 59
(broadly noting, in a subsection titled “Liquidity Risk” that the Fund “hold[s] investments . . .
having substantial market and/or credit risk which may be difficult to sell at certain periods of time”
and which the Fund “may not be able to dispose of … at the value the Fund places on them.”).
146. Id. at 38 (stating that the Committee also had “oversight of any third parties to whom any
responsibility for fair value and liquidity determinations [was] delegated.”).
147. § 270.22e-4(b)(1); see supra Sections IV.A.1, IV.A.3.
148. § 270.22e-4(b)(1)(i)(A).
149. Summary Prospectus: Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund, supra note 14, at 2.
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Second, in considering whether its strategy involved a highly concentrated
portfolio or large positions in particular issuers, Focused Credit might have taken
into account, for example, that “[a]s of July 2015, management had invested half
the fund’s assets in bonds rated below B and another 40% in nonrated” credit
instruments.150 Likewise, it would have considered some of the fund’s large
holdings, such as its “nearly 5% stake” in then troubled IHeartMedia (the fund’s
“largest individual holding” as of July 2015);151 or the roughly 20% ownership
“of a $250 million issue of low-rated bonds sold by New Enterprise Stone &
Lime Co.”152 These investments might have raised red flags for the Program
Administrator reviewing the Fund’s investment strategy and its liquidity risk.153
Lastly, with regards to the use of borrowings and derivatives for investment
purposes, no report has suggested that the Fund had an issue in this area.
Focused Credit was subject to stringent coverage requirements (i.e. to ensure it
had enough assets to cover its obligations) under Section 18 of the 1940 Act,
whether it borrowed from a bank or through financing transactions (which
require the segregation of liquid assets).154 Nevertheless, this may be an
important consideration for the Fund’s liquidity because “[s]egregated assets are
considered to be unavailable for sale or disposition, . . . unless replaced by other
appropriate non-segregated assets of equal value.”155 Thus, if the Fund received
significant redemption requests, it may have had to “unwind” (repay) portions
of its financing transactions (borrowings) by using its liquid assets, thereby
leaving less available to fulfill redemption requests.156
2. Classification of the Fund’s Portfolio Holdings and HLIM
As part of the Liquidity Program, Focused Credit would have had to classify
its portfolio investments into one of four liquidity categories (highly liquid,
moderately liquid, less liquid, and illiquid investment).157 The Fund had to
classify its investments after conducting a “reasonable inquiry,” taking into
account (1) “relevant ‘market, trading, and investment-specific
considerations’[,]” as well as (2) the “market depth” of the investments.158 The
SEC also suggested nine non-exclusive factors that the Fund could consider, and

150. Ptak, supra note 19.
151. Id.
152. Gregory Zuckerman & Matt Wirz, How the Third Avenue Fund Melted Down, THE WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2015 3:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-third-avenue-fund-melteddown-1450903135.
153. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 71. The Rule Release directly referred to Focused
Credit’s as an illustration of how a “concentrated portfolio” can “directly affect liquidity risk” and
in turn, shareholder’s ability to redeem their shares. Id. at 72.
154. Proposing Release, supra note 8, at 62,308.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4(a)(6), (8), (10),(12) (2019); see supra Section IV.A.2.
158. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 90–91.
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under the Liquidity Rule, it must review its investments classifications on a
monthly basis.159
Complying with the classification requirement has proved to be a highly
complex task,160 and as such, it is impracticable to speculate as to how the Fund
would have classified each of its holdings. Nevertheless, Focused Credit may
very well have deemed some of its concentrated investments (mentioned above)
and other high-yield bond holdings, as being “less liquid” or “illiquid.” As one
industry analyst noted, a fund with “large stakes in lower-quality bonds” may be
“particularly illiquid” and “could be difficult to unwind in a stressed credit
market,” especially if redemption requests pressure the fund to sell at
“punishingly low prices.”161 Ultimately, as one commenter to the Rule Proposal
highlighted, analyzing how a fund’s “portfolio’s assets are spread across” the
“spectrum from highly liquid to illiquid” provides an “important input into the
assessment, monitoring and management of a fund’s liquidity risk.”162
3. Highly Liquid Investment Minimum
After classifying its investments, Focused Credit then had to “determine and
periodically review”163 a minimum percentage of assets held in highly liquid
investments (a HLIM), and implement policies and procedures for responding
to a HLIM shortfall. This may have benefitted the Fund, especially in ensuring
that it maintained enough liquid assets to cover potential “redemption requests
without significant dilution to remaining investors’ interests.”164
Moreover, had the Fund faced a HLIM shortfall before its collapse became
imminent, there would have been key early warnings that might have prompted
it to take serious remedial action. Specifically, the Fund’s HLIM shortfall
policies and procedures had to require the Program Administrator to: (1) report
to the Fund’s board no later than its next regularly scheduled meeting, the causes
and extent of, as well as responses to, the shortfall; and (2) if the shortfall lasted
more than seven consecutive calendar days, “report to the board within one
business day thereafter with an explanation of how the fund planned to restore
its minimum within a reasonable period of time.” As the SEC suggests, such
reporting may allow a fund’s board to exercise more oversight, understand the
circumstances surrounding the fund’s liquidity risk, and evaluate the

159. See supra Section IV.A.2.a.
160. Compliance Date Extension Release, supra note 89, at 8342, 8344 (noting how the SEC
ultimately decided to extend the compliance date for the classification and the HLIM requirements
after receiving requests from commenters who had concerns “regarding the difficulties . . . in
preparing to comply in a timely manner” with the initial compliance dates).
161. Ptak, supra note 19.
162. J.P. Morgan Comment Letter, supra note 142, at 3.
163. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,238 n. 1102.
164. Id. at 82,166.
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effectiveness of the HLIM and that of the Program as a whole.165 Focused Credit
would likely have benefited from such additional safeguards.
4. Limitation on Illiquid Investments
The Liquidity Rule would have also prohibited the Fund from acquiring “any
illiquid investments, if immediately after the acquisition, [the Fund] . . . would
have invested more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid investments that are
assets.”166 Indeed, the Fund first needed to determine what it considered to be
an “illiquid investment” under its classification regime. However, as industry
analysts suggested, by July 2015, the Fund held almost twenty percent of its
assets in “hard to value and trade” securities, held highly concentrated
investments and centered its investment strategy on below-investment-grade
credit instruments.167 Under such circumstances, the Fund may well have
exceeded the fifteen percent limit before its collapse.
Exceeding the illiquid investment limit would have triggered important
reporting obligations for the Program Administrator to the Fund’s board.
Specifically, the Program Administrator had to report to the board within one
business day of the occurrence of the excess with an explanation of the extent of
the excess, what caused it, and a plan for the Fund to bring its holdings to or
below the fifteen percent limit within a “reasonable . . . time.”168 This could have
brought the Fund’s liquidity issues to light earlier and allowed more time for the
Fund and the board to address them. Likewise, if the excess continued for more
than 30 days, the board had to assess whether the remedial plan presented to it
continued to be in the Fund’s best interest.169 Such periodic review should have
“provided sufficient information and regular updates” for the Fund’s board to
“make an informed judgment,” as the SEC suggests, ideally prompting the board
to ask management for further remedial actions before it was too late.170
5. Focused Credit’s Board Oversight
In addition to the oversight authority that the Fund’s board had with regards
to the HLIM and the limitation on illiquid investments, as noted in Sections
V.A.2 and V.A.3, the Liquidity Rule also required a majority of the Fund’s
independent board directors to: (1) approve the initial Liquidity Management
Program, (2) approve the Program Administrator, and (3) review, at least
annually, the Program Administrator’s written report about the Program’s
operation, and assess the adequacy and effectiveness of its implementation.171

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Adopting Release supra note 12, at 82,204.
17 C.F.R. § 270.22e-4 (b)(1)(iv) (2019).
McLaughlin, supra note 11; see supra Section III.A.2.
§ 270.22e-4 (b)(1)(iv)(A).
Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 82,2007.
Id.
§ 270.22e-4 (b)(2).
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Under these requirements, Focused Credit's board would have obtained key
additional knowledge and oversight of the Fund's liquidity, as well as additional
leverage over the Fund's liquidity risk management practices. Through the
review of the Program, assuming it was in place for long enough, the board may
have learned of the Fund’s liquidity issues well before they became untenable,
thus encouraging the adoption of greater measures to mitigate them. Thus, if
management was being aggressive or naïve in its assessment of liquidity risk,
the board may have had a more objective perspective and would have had the
authority to dictate greater prudence in managing the Fund.
B. Rule 22e-4 Also Provides the SEC with a New Remedy to Bring
Enforcement Actions Against Persons Who Failed to Manage Liquidity
Sufficiently
With the Liquidity Rule enacted, the SEC can now bring enforcement actions
under Section 41172 and Section 48173 of the 1940 Act alleging a violation of the
Liquidity Rule.
Additionally, the liquidity disclosure and reporting
requirements likely gives the SEC a clearer picture of funds’ investment
practices and how they manage their liquidity. Taking advantage of such
increased transparency, and depending on the facts, the SEC could bring
enforcement actions against persons such as: (1) the Liquidity Administrator, if
he/she did not adequately and objectively analyze the fund’s liquidity and failed
to flag problems in time; (2) the fund’s board, if there is evidence that it should
have taken more robust action; (3) the adviser, if it failed to meet any
responsibilities under the Program; (4) the fund’s investment personnel, if they
knew there was a problem and ignored it; or (5) the chief compliance officer
(CCO) or the adviser’s general counsel, if there is evidence that they should have
acted but failed to do so.174

172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-41(d), (e)(1) (2012); see also James G. Cavoli, et al., The SEC’s Mutual
Fund Fee Initiative: What to Expect, 16 WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG. 1, 7–8 (2010),
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/0/1033/111610_Westlaw_SCL1614_Commentary_C
avoli.pdf. Noting that under Section 42 [now Section 41] of the 1940 Act, the SEC has
[T]he power to bring an action for injunctive relief and/or monetary penalties “whenever
it shall appear to the commission that any person has engaged or is about to engage in
any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of any
rule, regulation or order hereunder.”
Id.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-48 (2006); see also Cavoli, supra note 172, at 7 (highlighting that Section
48 gives the SEC the ability to pursue “aider and abettor liability” under the 1940 Act, whereby
“any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in
violation of a provision of this act . . . [or of any rule or regulation hereunder], shall be deemed to
be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided.”).
174. See BlackRock Advisors, LLC and Bartholomew A. Battista, Investment Company Act
Release No. 31558, 2 (Apr. 20, 2015) (finding Mr. Battista, BlackRock’s Chief Compliance Officer
(“CCO”), at fault, in part because he “knew about [the portfolio managers’] violations [of Rule
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The SEC could potentially bring an enforcement action against the relevant
persons for missing the early warning that a robust liquidity management
program would have picked up. Moreover, management’s failure to adequately
report liquidity problems to the fund’s board could also form the basis for SEC
action; and even if a fund’s liquidity classifications appear to be too generous,
potential enforcement action could ensue for making a filing with the SEC that
includes a misstatement.175
Ultimately, the potential for liability might provide an additional incentive for
funds (like Focused Credit) and their related persons to establish robust liquidity
risk management programs and to address liquidity issues promptly. Otherwise,
the SEC would have the option to go after those responsible for failing to manage
fund’s liquidity adequately and perhaps even provide some relief for the affected
investors.
C. Recent market developments: COVID-19 Tests Funds’ Liquidity Risk
Management Programs
In mid-March of 2020, markets “entered bear-market territory,” as COVID19 “was officially declared a pandemic.”176 An industry analyst then reminded
us that “[r]ecession fears typically spark a flight to quality,” and, as this
Comment highlighted, such fears may lead to large waves of mutual fund
investors seeking to redeem their shares to get their money back.177 Such “heavy
redemptions” briefly took place in various parts of the mutual fund world.178
Indeed, researcher Antonio Falato and his peers noted that the COVID-19
crisis brought about “large outflows [that] were sustained for weeks, widespread
among both investment-grade and high-yield funds, persistent, and correlated
across asset-classes within-funds.”179 Further, Falato’s group’s analysis

38a-1(a)(4)(ii)(B) under the 1940 Act] and knew or should have known that they were not reported
to the funds’ boards.”).
175. See Evergreen Investment Management Company, LLC, Investment Company Act No.
28759, 2, 13 (June 8, 2009) (providing an example of an SEC enforcement action against an adviser
for, among other things, overstating the fund’s net asset value (“NAV”) and withholding
information that could have negatively affected the price of the fund’s securities, which resulted in
the fund filing documents with the SEC that contained “untrue statements of material fact” in
violation of Section 34(b) of the 1940 Act).
176. Russel Kinnel, How Mutual Funds Look After the Coronavirus Meltdown,
MORNINGSTAR: FUND TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/969801/
how-mutual-funds-look-after-the-coronavirus-meltdown.
177. John Rekenthaler, Did Mutual Funds Perform as Expected During the Mini-Crash? (Mar.
6, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/970581/did-mutual-funds-perform-as-expectedduring-the-mini-crash; see supra Section III; Flight to Quality, INVESTOPEDIA (May 4, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/flighttoquality.asp (defining “flight to quality” as investors’
actions to move their capital “away from riskier investments and into safer ones”).
178. Rekenthaler supra note 177.
179. Antonio Falato, et al., Financial Fragility in the COVID-19 Crisis: The Case of
Investment Funds in Corporate Bond Markets 11 (U. Chi., Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ.,
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suggests that such “large outflows” were in part driven by funds’ “illiquidity and
vulnerability to fire-sales,” and that funds holding less liquid bonds tended to
suffer more severe outflows.180 This seems to fall in line with this Comment’s
assessment in Section III regarding the increased liquidity challenges that funds
primarily holding high-yield bonds or secured loans may face in times of stress
(when such assets tend to be less liquid).181
Ultimately, Falato and his colleagues point out that outflows started to cede
in the last week of March, and “fully reverse[d]” after April 9th, likely in
response to the Federal Reserve’s announcements “about extraordinary direct
interventions in corporate-bond markets,” which “alleviat[ed] fund stress.”182
However, the question remains: what role (if any) did the newly required
liquidity risk management programs play in helping funds withstand the stress
from the COVID-19 crisis? Although not by design, the March episode could
serve as a good test for the Liquidity Rule’s effectiveness, and the SEC might
benefit from using this opportunity to conduct sweep exams to see if fund groups
used a robust approach to comply with their own procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Liquidity Rule may have helped Focused Credit better assess and manage
its liquidity risk by requiring it to implement a Liquidity Risk Management
Program, classify its investments, adopt a Highly Liquid Investment Minimum,
limit the Fund’s illiquid investments and allow the board more opportunities for
oversight. The Fund may have particularly benefitted from reconsidering the
appropriateness of its investment strategy, which focused on debt instruments
that may pose increased liquidity issues in times of financial stress, and from the
early warnings that the Program would have provided. Moreover, Focused
Credit would have had an additional incentive to implement an effective
liquidity risk management program, if nothing else, to avoid any potential
liability for violating the Liquidity Rule.
Altogether, the tools that the Liquidity Rule provided may have better
prepared the Fund for covering large redemption requests in light of a faltering
bond market, at least to a certain extent. This, of course, discounts the notion
that in the face of a true crisis, if a fund faces redemption requests by virtually

Working Paper No. 2020-98, 2020), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP
_202098.pdf.
180. Id. at 16–17, 19.
181. See supra Section III (breaking down the role of liquidity in mutual funds and explaining
that, when a fund faces outsized redemptions, the interests of shareholders that stay in the fund may
be hurt if it lacks cash and cash equivalent holdings," and "its assets are difficult to convert into
cash without having to do so at prices lower than their carrying value on the fund's books" (i.e.,
fire-sales)).
182. Falato, supra note 179, at 11–12 (detailing two announcements from the Federal Reserve
(the “Fed”) describing actions that the Fed took in March and April to restore liquidity in the
corporate-bond and other markets).
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all of its investors, there is very little that a liquidity risk management program
may be able to do to save it, as the fund might have to sell all of its assets to pay
investors back. Ultimately, with the liquidity crunch from the COVID-19 crisis
(at least temporarily) behind us, regulators and the industry will have the
opportunity to assess whether the systems and precautions that the Liquidity
Rule mandated actually made any difference in helping funds stay afloat when
market liquidity evaporated.

